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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
BRIGHAM G. HOLBROOK and 
BETTY HOLBROOK, his wife, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
'VILLIAM M. HODSON and 
ROSE B. HODSON, his wife, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Case No. 
11767 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
The decision of the Court dated March 12, 1970, 
refers to the fact that on June 27, 1969 the Court denied 
the petition of plaintiffs for an extraordinary writ, but 
the decision gives no weight to that action. The matter 
was argued before several of the Justices and the writ 
was denied upon the stated reason that the District 
Court had jurisdiction to consider the motion for relief 
from late filing. 
1 
The dismissal of the appeal by the decision of 
March 12, 1970 is in error for these reasons: 
1. Rule 60 ( b) ( 1) provides relief after the time 
for motion for new trial has run. 
2. The motion for relief from late filing was a 
60 (b) ( 1) motion. 
3. Denial of respondents' petition for extraordi-
nary writ was proper. 
4. Dismissal of the appeal in June, 1969 for lack 
of jurisdiction was not the order of the Court, and it 
would have been erroneous on that ground. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1. RULE 60 (b) (1) PROVIDES 
RELIEF AFTER THE TIME FOR MOTION 
FOR NEW TRIAL HAS RUN. 
The Court holds that Rule 60 ( b) ( 1) does not 
and cannot afford relief where the motion for new trial 
is not filed within ten days after entry of judgment. 
This is contrary to the language of 60 ( b) ( 1) and to 
the prior holding of this Court in I(ettner v. Snow, 13 
U.2d 382, 375 P. 2d 28, and to the holdings of the 
United States Supreme Court under a similar rule in 
Harris Truck Lines, Inc., v. Cherry Meat Packers, 
Inc., 371 U.S. 215, 217, 9 L.Ed. 2d 261, 263, S. Ct. 283; 
Thompson v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 
375 U.S. 389, 84 S. Ct. 397, 11 L.Ed. 2d 404; Wolf-
2 
sohn v. Hankin, 376 U.S. 203, 84 S. Ct. 699, 11 L.Ed. 
2d 636. 
Rule 6 ( b) ( 1) provides for relief before the ex-
piration of prescribed time and 6 ( b) ( 2) provides for 
relief after expiration of the prescribed time, 
". . . but it may not extend the time for taking 
any action under Rules 25, 50 (b), 52 (b) ( d) 
and (e), 60 (b) and 73 (a) and (g) except to 
the extent and under the conditions stated in 
them." 
Rule 60 ( b) provides for relief from a final judg 
ment for: " ( 1) Mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or ex-
cusable neglect." which motion shall be made within a 
reasonable time "and for reasons ( 1), ( 2), ( 3), or ( 4) 
not more than three months after the judgment, order, 
or proceeding was entered or taken." 
In Kettner v. Snow, supra, the defendant filed a 
belated motion for new trial under Rule 60 (b). This 
Court held that in a proper case, and for the reasons 
stated in the rule such relief could be granted "and the 
burden of showing facts to justify doing so is upon him 
who seeks such relief." 
That the motion for new trial may be filed late for 
the reasons stated in Rule 60 ( b) ( 1) of the Federal 
Rules, which is the same, is held by the Federal Courts. 
In Thompson v. Immigration and Naturalization Ser-
vice, supra, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal 
because made outside the prescribed sixty-day period 
after entry of judgment. But the Supreme Court 
3 
granted certiorari, citing Harris Truck Lines, supra, 
because in the District Court the motion was treated as 
having been timely filed until after the time to appeal 
ran out. And this was done even though Rule 60 ( b) 
( I ) was not specifically relied on. 
As being analogous to Thompson, appellants point 
out that their motion for new trial was filed February 6, 
19G9. The defendants' motion to strike because the mo-
tion for new trial was late was not filed until March 26, 
1969, apparently calculated to be after time for appeal 
had run. In Thompson the Court had assumed that the 
appeal was timely and counsel on the other side had 
permitted that assumption. The Court felt that Thomp-
son had been lulled into a false security. The Court and 
the defendants in the case at bar also believed the mo-
tion for new trial was timely and had the plaintiffs acted 
promptly to attack its timeliness the motion for new 
trial could have been abandoned as having been filed 
late and still there could have been a timely appeal. 
Rule 73 (a) provides specifically that relief from 
the passage of one month can be had only where the 
excusable neglect is based upon "failure of a party to 
learn of the judgment." There i.s no such limitation in 
Rule 60 (b) (I), which provides relief from final judg-
ments generally within three months after the judgment 
was entered and thereafter for some reasons. 
By adverting to Anderson v. Anderson, where no 
question of a motion for new trial was involved and 
there was simply a failure to take the appeal in time, 
4 
the Court in its decision has completely overlooked 
Kettner v. Snow, supra, and the many federal cases 
where relief has been given under 60 (b) ( 1) where mo-
tion for new trial has been filed after the time has run. 
U.S. v. Wissohicken Tool Works (C. A. 2d 952), 
200 F.2d 936; Nicholson v. Allied Chemical Corp. (Pa. 
1961), 200 F. Supp. 206; Minneapolis Brewing Co. v. 
Merritt (Md. 1956), 143 F. Supp. 146; U.S. v. Gould 
(C. A. 5, 1962), 301 F.2d 353. 
POINT 2. THE MOTION FOR RELIEF 
FROl\I LATE FILING WAS A 60 (b) (1) MO-
TION. 
The Court suggests that because interlineation was 
made in the motion for relief from late filing on June 
20, 1969, the motion then became for the first time a 
60 ( b) ( 1 ) motion. 
The language of the motion for relief from late 
filing ( R-39) is plainly the language only of Rule 60 
(b) ( 1) supported by the affidavit of counsel, which 
plainly sets out the fact of inadvertence and excusable 
neglect appropriate only to Rule 60 (b) and not to Rule 
59. 
Furthermore, there is good authority that a mo-
tion made under Rule 59 will be treated by the Court 
as a motion under Rule 60 (b) where the facts are ap-
propriate, consistent with a liberal interpretation and 
application of Rule 60 (b). These are the holdings in 
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U.S. v. Wissohicken Tool Works, supra; Columbia 
River Packers Association v. Hinton, 34 F. Supp. 970, 
reversed on other grounds 117 F.2d 310; Walling v. 
Todd, 3 F.D.R. 490. 
This is also the langauge of Moore's Federal Prac-
tice, Vol. 6-A, page 3849, where it is stated: 
"The court may, however, treat the untimely 
Rule 59 motion as a motion under Rule 60, in 
order to determine if the movant has made out a 
case for relief under the latter rule." 
And again at pages 3851-3852 :Moore states: 
"A motion for new trial that is made within the 
ten day limit of Rule 59 ( b) invokes the obliga-
tory discretion of the trial court, which must af-
firmatively exercise its discretion either to grant 
or deny the motion. If, however, the motion is 
not timely, the trial court may not exercise any 
discretion, but is obligated to deny the motion for 
lack of power to grant new trial relief, although 
the court may treat the untimely motion as one 
for relief under Rule 60, which has a much longer 
time limit, if the facts alleged in the motion war-
rant relief under the latter rule." 
This statement from Moore also bears out the prev-
ious statement that Anderson v. Anderson cited by this 
Court in its decision is not analogous because there was 
no consideration of Rule 60 (b) in the Anderson case. 
POINT 3. DENIAL OF RESPONDENTS' 
PETITION FOR EXTRAORDINARY WRIT 
AS PROPER. 
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The chronology of the petition for extraordinary 
writ was as follows: The motion to strike because mo-
tion for new trial was late was filed March 26 1969 
. ' 
( R-34) ; the motion for relief from late filing with ac-
companying affidavit was served March 31, 1969 (R-
39-42); the Jay Holt affidavit was served April 2, 
1969; and all were filed April 11, 1969 (R-39). 
Judge Hanson then denied the motion to strike 
and denied the motion for new trial on April 14, 1969, 
in which he specifically found it "unnecessary to rule 
on the defendants" motion for relief from late filing." 
(R-43) The defendants then gave notice of appeal on 
April 16, 1969, which appeal was dismissed June 2, 
1969, and a remittitur issued (R-53). The court's order 
recited "It is ordered that the same be granted and the 
appeal dismissed.", without any reference to the pend-
ency of the motion for relief from late filing, although 
that was argued before this Court as Point 3 of a writ-
ten memorandum of authorities filed with this Court in 
its case No. 11597. 
It is appellants' position that this simply returned 
the case to the District Court, which was then confront-
ed with the undisposed of "motion for relief from late 
filing." This was noticed up for hearing on June 14, 
1969 to be heard June 20, 1969, which was granted June 
23, 1969 (R-57, 58, 59). 
The plaintiffs then filed a petition for extraordi-
nary relief on June 27, 1969 as case No. 11713. The 
Court may recall that in denying this petition it was 
7 
stated by one of the Justices that the basis of the denial 
of the petition was that the District Court had juris-
diction to determine the motion for relief from late 
filing. 
The District Court then proceeded to take juris-
diction of the motion for relief of late filing which it 
granted ( R-58) and denied the motion for new trial on 
July 23, I 969 ( R-73), and in the same order granted a 
further hearing on the plaintiffs motion for order in 
supplemental proceeding. Notice of appeal was then 
taken on July 30, I969 (R-75). 
The rationale of the denial of the petition for extra-
ordinary writ seems to be as follows : After the motion 
to strike the motion for new trial was filed defendants 
scrutinized the pleadings and recognized the possibility 
that the motion for new trial was filed late and there-
fore filed a motion for relief from late filing under Rule 
60 (b). The District Court erroneously concluded that 
the judgment was entered on the day it was received and 
docketed in the Clerk's office and failed to dispose of 
the motion for relief from late filing. This Court re-
versed the District Judge as to when the judgment is en-
tered by dismissing the appeal and without giving a writ-
ten decision. This Court could have passed on the pend-
ency of the motion for relief from late filing, but instead 
seemed to refer the matter to the District Court which 
has discretion as to disposition of an application for 
relief under Rule 60 (b). Wolfsohn v. Raab (E.D.Pa.), 
II F.R.D. 254; Brest v. Philadelphia Transportation 
8 
Co. (E.D.Pa. 1959), 273 F. 2d 22; John E. Smith's 
Sons v. Lattimer Foundry Machine 19 F.R.D. 
379, affirmed 239 F. 2d 815; Nugent v. Yellow Cab 
Co. ( C.A. 7, 1961) 295 F.2d 794, cert. den. 369 U.S. 
828. 
The merits of the motion for relief from late filing 
under Rule 60 (b) ( 1) were before this Court on cross-
appeal (R-79, 80), and it is submitted that there is 
ample support for Judge Hanson's ruling in the 
cited herein. Also, if Judge Hanson was of the opinion 
that the judgment was not entered until it was recorded 
by the Clerk's office, it seems reasonable that counsel 
could take the same view in examining the judgment of 
the Court showing it to have been in the Clerk's office 
on January 27. 
POINT 4. DISMISSAL OF THE APPEAL 
IN JUNE, 1969 FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION 
"\VAS NOT THE ORDER OF THE COURT, 
AND IT "\VOULD HA VE BEEN ERRONEOUS 
ON THAT GROUND. 
The language of the decision is: 
"Plaintiffs contend that this appeal should be 
dismissed. We agree; when this court initially 
dismissed the appeal in June of 1969 for lack of 
jurisdiction, the matter became final." 
As above stated in the chronological statement, when 
this case was first appealed there was pending in the 
District Court the motion for relief from late filing and 
9 
the only order made by this Court was that the appeal 
should be dismissed, with no statement as to lack of jur-
isdiction and no statement as to finality. It was the dis-
missal of the appeal which brought before the District 
Court as a matter of required consideration the motion 
for relief from late filing, which the court had specific-
ally ruled was not previously considered by it. 
Appellants submit that the ruling of the Court on 
July 14, 1969 was sound and recognized the jurisdiction 
of the District Court to consider the motion for relief 
from late filing, which the District Court did with ample 
support for its action. 
Appellants submit that the Court should grant a 
rehearing before holding that the denial of the petition 
for extraordinary writ was a nullity, or should grant 
a rehearing on the merits of this appeal, so that the de-
fendants, who certainly were not guilty of any inadvert-
ance, can have the merits of their defense considered by 
this Honorable Court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RICHARD & WATKINS 
By Richard L. Bird, Jr. 
720 Newhouse Building 
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